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Abstract
We consider two-person sports where each rally is initiated by a
server, the other player (the receiver) becoming the server when he/she
wins a rally. Historically, these sports used a scoring based on the
side-out scoring system, in which points are only scored by the server.
Recently, however, some federations have switched to the rally-point
scoring system in which a point is scored on every rally. As various
authors before us, we study how much this change affects the game.
Our approach is based on a rally-level analysis of the process through
which, besides the well-known probability distribution of the scores, we
also obtain the distribution of the number of rallies. This yields a com-
prehensive knowledge of the process at hand, and allows for an in-depth
comparison of both scoring systems. In particular, our results help to
explain why the transition from one scoring system to the other has
more important implications than those predicted from game-winning
probabilities alone. Some of our findings are quite surprising, and
unattainable through Monte Carlo experiments. Our results are of
high practical relevance to international federations and local tourna-
ment organizers alike, and also open the way to efficient estimation of
the rally-winning probabilities, which should have a significant impact
on the quality of ranking procedures.
Keywords. Combinatorial derivations; Duration analysis; Point estimation; Rank-
ing procedures; Scoring rules; Two-person sports
1 Introduction.
We consider a class of two-person sports for which each rally is initiated by a
server—the other player is then called the receiver—and for which the rules and
scoring system satisfy one of the following two definitions.
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Side-out scoring system: (i) the server in the first rally is determined
by flipping a coin. (ii) If a rally is won by the server, the latter scores
a point and serves in the next rally. Otherwise, the receiver becomes
the server in the next rally, but no point is scored. (iii) The winner of
the game is the first player to score n points.
Rally-point scoring system: (i) the server in the first rally is determined
by flipping a coin. (ii) If a rally is won by the server, the latter serves
in the next rally. Otherwise, the receiver becomes the server in the
next rally. A point is scored after each rally. (iii) The winner of the
game is the first player to score n points.
A match would typically consist of a sequence of such games, and the winner
of the match is the first player to win M games. Actually, it is usually so that
in game m ≥ 2, the first server is not determined by flipping a coin, but rather
according to some prespecified rule: the most common one states that the first
server in game m is the winner in game m− 1, but alternatively, the players might
simply take turns as the first server in each game until the match is over. It turns
out that, in the probabilistic model we consider below, the probability that a fixed
player wins the match is the same under both rules; see Anderson (1977). This
clearly allows us to focus on a single game in the sequel—as in most previous works
in the field (references will be given below). Extensions of our results to the match
level can then trivially be obtained by appropriate conditioning arguments, taking
into account the very rule adopted for determining the first server in each game.
The side-out scoring system has been used in various sports, sometimes up to
tiny unimportant refinements, involving typically, in case of a tie at n − 1, the
possibility (for the receiver) to choose whether the game should be played to n+ `
(for some fixed ` ≥ 2) or to n; see Section 2. When based on the so-called English
scoring system, Squash currently uses (n,M) = (9, 3). Racquetball is essentially
characterized by (n,M) = (15, 2) (the possible third game is actually played to
11 only). Until 2006, Badminton was using (n,M) = (15, 2) and (n,M) = (11, 2)
for men’s and women’s singles, respectively—with an exception in 2002, where
(n,M) = (7, 3) was experienced. Volleyball, for which the term persons above
should of course be understood as teams, was based on (n,M) = (15, 3) until 2000.
In both badminton and volleyball, this scoring system was then replaced with the
rally-point system. Similarly, squash, at the international level, now is based on
the American version of its scoring system, which is nothing but the rally-point
system, in this case with (n,M) = (11, 3). Investigating the deep implications of
this transition from the original side-out scoring system to the rally-point scoring
system was one of the main motivations for this work; see Section 4.
Irrespective of the scoring system adopted, the most common probabilistic
model for the sequence of rallies assumes that the rally outcomes are mutually
independent and are, conditionally on the server, identically distributed. This im-
plies that the game is governed by the parameter (pa, pb) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], where
the rally-winning probability pa (resp., pb) is the probability that Player A (resp.,
Player B) wins a rally when serving. This means that players do not get tired
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through the match, or that they do not get nervous when playing crucial points.
More precisely, they might get tired or nervous, but if they do, they should do so at
the same moment and to the same extent, so that it does not affect their respective
rally-winning probability. We will throughout refer to this probabilistic model as
the server model, in contrast with the no-server model in which any rally is won
by A with probability p irrespective of the server, that is, the submodel obtained
when taking p = pa = 1− pb.
The probabilistic properties of a single game played under the side-out scoring
system have been investigated in various works. Hsi and Burich (1971) attempted to
derive the probability distribution of game scores—in the sequel, we simply speak of
the score distribution—in terms of pa and pb, but their derivation based on standard
combinatorial arguments was wrong. The correct score distribution (hence also the
resulting game-winning probabilities) was first obtained in Phillips (1978) by apply-
ing results on sums of random variables having the modified geometric distribution.
Keller (1984) derived probabilities of very extreme scores, whereas Marcus (1985)
derived the complete score distribution in the no-server model. Strauss and Arnold
(1987), by identifying the point earning process as a Markov chain, obtained more
directly the same general result as Phillips (1978). They further used the score dis-
tribution to define maximum likelihood estimators and moment estimators of the
rally-winning probabilities (both in the server and no-server models), and based
on these estimates a ranking system (relying on Bradley-Terry paired comparison
methods) for the players of a league or tournament. Simmons (1989) determined
the score distribution under the two scoring systems, this time by using a quick
and direct combinatorial analysis of a single game. He discussed handicapping and
strategies (for deciding whether the receiver should go for a game played to n + `
or not in case of a tie at n − 1), and attempted a comparison of the two scoring
systems. More recently, Percy (2009) used Monte Carlo simulations to compare
game-winning probabilities and expected durations for both scoring systems in the
no-server model.
To sum up, the score distributions have been obtained through several differ-
ent probabilistic methods, and were used to discuss several aspects of the game.
In contrast, the distribution of the number of rallies needed to complete a single
game (D, say) remains virtually unexplored for the side-out scoring system (for the
rally-point scoring system, the distribution of D is simply determined by the score
distribution). To the best of our knowledge, the only theoretical result on D under
the side-out scoring system provides lower and upper bounds for the expected value
of D; see (20) in Simmons (1989), or (2) below. Beyond the lack of exact results
on D (only approximate theoretical results or simulation-based results are available
so far), it should be noted that only the expected value of D has been studied in
the literature. This is all the more surprising because, in various sports (e.g., in
badminton and volleyball), uncertainty about D—which is related to its variance,
not to its expected value—was one of the most important arguments to switch from
the side-out scoring system to the rally-point scoring system. Exact results on the
moments of D—or even better, its distribution—are then much desirable as they
would allow to investigate whether the transition to the rally-point system indeed
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reduced uncertainty about D. More generally, precise results on the distribution
of D would allow for a much deeper comparison of both scoring systems. They
would also be of high practical relevance, e.g., to tournament organizers, who need
planning their events and deciding in advance the number of matches—hence the
number of players—the events will be able to host.
For the side-out scoring system, however, results on the distribution of D can-
not be obtained from a point-level analysis of the game. That is the reason why
the present work rather relies on a rally-level combinatorial analysis. This allows
to get of rid of the uncertainty about the number of rallies needed to score a single
point, and results into an exact computation of the distribution of D—and actually,
even of the number of rallies needed to achieve any fixed score. We derive explicitly
the expectation and variance of D, and use our results to compare the two scor-
ing systems not only in terms of game-winning probabilities, but also in terms of
durations. Our results reveal significant differences between both scoring systems,
and help to explain why the transition from one scoring system to the other has
more important implications than those predicted from game-winning probabilities
alone. As suggested above, they could be used by tournament organizers to plan
accurately their events, but also by national or international federations to better
perform the possible transition from the side-out scoring system to the rally-point
one; see Section 6 for a discussion. Finally, our results open the way to efficient esti-
mation of the rally-winning probabilities (based on observed scores and durations),
which might have important consequences for the resulting ranking procedures,
since rankings usually are to be based on small numbers of “observations” (here,
games).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe our rally-level
analysis of a single game played under the side-out scoring system, and show that
it also leads to the score distribution already derived in Phillips (1978), Strauss and
Arnold (1987), and Simmons (1989). Section 3 explains how this rally-level analysis
further provides (i) the expectation and variance of the number of rallies needed to
achieve a fixed score (Section 3.1) and also (ii) the corresponding exact distribution
(Section 3.2). In Section 4, we then use our results in order to compare the side-
out and rally-point scoring systems, both in terms of game-winning probabilities
(Section 4.1) and durations (Section 4.2). In Section 5, we perform Monte Carlo
simulations and compare the results with our theoretical findings. Section 6 presents
the conclusion and provides some final comments. Finally, an appendix collects
proofs of technical results.
2 Rally-level derivation of the score distribution
under the side-out scoring system.
In this section, we conduct our rally-level analysis of a single game played un-
der the side-out scoring system. We will make the distinction between A-games
and B-games, with the former (resp., the latter) being defined as games in which
Player A (resp., Player B) is the first server. Wherever possible, we will state our
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results/definitions in the context of A-games only; in such cases the correspond-
ing results/definitions for B-games can then be obtained by exchanging the roles
played by A and B, that is, by exchanging (i) pa and pb and (ii) the number of
points scored by each player. Whenever not specified, the server S will be consid-
ered random, and we will denote by sa := P[S = A] and sb := P[S = B] = 1−sa the
probabilities that the game considered is an A-game and a B-game, respectively.
This both covers games where the first server is determined by flipping a coin and
games where the first server is fixed (by letting sa ∈ {0, 1}).
Our rally-level analysis of the game will be based on the concepts of interrup-
tions and exchanges first introduced in Hsi and Burich (1971). More precisely, we
adopt
Definition 2.1 An A-interruption is a sequence of rallies in which B gains the
right to serve from A, scores at least one point, then (unless the game is over)
relinquishes the service back to A, who will score at least one point. An exchange is a
sequence of two rallies in which one player gains the right to serve, but immediately
loses this right before he/she scores any point (so that the potential of consecutive
scoring by his/her opponent is not interrupted).
We point out that A-interruptions are characterized in terms of score changes
only (and in particular may contain one or several exchanges) and that, at any
time, an exchange clearly occurs with probability q := qaqb := (1− pa)(1− pb).
Now, for C ∈ {A,B}, denote by Eα,β,C(r, j) the event associated with a se-
quence of rallies that (i) gives raise to α points scored by Player A and β points
scored by Player B, (ii) involves exactly r A-interruptions and j exchanges, and (iii)
is such that Player C scores a point in the last rally; the superscript C therefore
indicates who is scoring the last point, and it is assumed here that α > 0 (resp.,
β > 0) if C = A (resp., if C = B). We will write
pα,β,C2C1 (r, j) := P[E
α,β,C2(r, j)|S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}.
We then have the following result (see the Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 2.1 Let γ0 := min{β, 1}, γ1 := min{α, β}, and γ2 := min{α, β − 1}.
Then, setting
(−1
−1
)
:= 1, we have pα,β,AA (r, j) =
(
α+β+j−1
j
)(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
pαap
β
b q
r+j, r ∈
{γ0, . . . , γ1}, j ∈ N, and pα,β,BA (r, j) =
(
α+β+j−1
j
)(
α
r−1
)(
β−1
r−1
)
pαap
β
b qaq
r+j−1, r ∈
{1, . . . , γ2 + 1}, j ∈ N.
By taking into account all possible values for the numbers ofA-interruptions and
exchanges, Lemma 2.1 quite easily leads to the following result (see the Appendix
for the proof), which then trivially provides the score distribution in an A-game,
hence also the corresponding game-winning probabilities.
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Theorem 2.1 Let pα,β,C2C1 := P[E
α,β,C2 |S = C1], where Eα,β,C2 := ∪r,j Eα,β,C2(r, j),
with C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}. Then pα,β,AA = p
α
ap
β
b
(1−q)α+β
∑γ1
r=γ0
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
qr and pα,β,BA =
pαap
β
b qa
(1−q)α+β
∑γ2+1
r=1
(
α
r−1
)(
β−1
r−1
)
qr−1.
In the sequel, we denote game scores by couples of integers, where the first entry
(resp., second entry) stands for the number of points scored by Player A (resp., by
Player B). With this notation, a C-game ends on the score (n, k) (resp., (k, n)),
k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, with probability pn,k,AC (resp., pk,n,BC ), hence is won by A
(resp., by B) with the (game-winning) probability
pAC := P[E
A|S = C] =
n−1∑
k=0
pn,k,AC
(resp., pBC := 1 − pAC); throughout, EA := ∪n−1k=0En,k,A (resp., EB := ∪n−1k=0Ek,n,B)
denotes the event that the game—irrespective of the initial server—is won by A
(resp., by B). Of course, unconditional on the initial server, we have
pn,k,A := P[En,k,A] = pn,k,AA sa+p
n,k,A
B sb, p
k,n,B := P[Ek,n,B ] = pk,n,BA sa+p
k,n,B
B sb,
and
pC := P[EC ] = pCAsa + p
C
Bsb,
for C ∈ {A,B}.
Figures 1(a)-(b) present, for n = 15, the score distributions associated with (pa, pb) =
(.7, .5), (.6, .5), (.5, .5), and (.4, .5). We reversed the k-axis in Figure 1(b), since,
among all scores associated with a victory of B, the score (14,15) can be considered
the closest to the score (15,14) (associated with a victory of A). It then makes
sense to regard Figures 1(a)-(b) as a single plot. The resulting “global” probability
curves are quite smooth and, as expected, unimodal (with the exception of the
pa = pb = .5 curve, which is slightly bimodal). It appears that these score distri-
butions are extremely sensitive to (pa, pb), as are the corresponding game-winning
probabilities (pAA ranges from .94 to .22, when, for fixed pb = .5, pa goes from
.7 to .4). For pa = pb = .5, we would expect the global probability curve to be
symmetric. The advantage Player A is given by serving first in the game, how-
ever, makes this curve slightly asymmetric; this is quantified by the corresponding
probability that A wins the game, namely pAA = .53 > .47 = p
B
A .
As mentioned in the Introduction, sports based on the side-out scoring system
may involve tie-breaks in case of a tie at n − 1. This means that, at this tie, the
receiver has the option of playing through to n or “setting to `” (for a fixed ` ≥ 2),
in which case the winner is the first player to score ` further points. For instance,
games in the current side-out scoring system for squash are played to n = 9 points,
and the receiver, at (8, 8), may decide whether the game is to 9 or 10 points (` = 2).
Before the transition to the rally-point system in 2006, similar tie-breaks were used
in badminton, there with n = 15 and ` = 3. Assuming that the game is always set
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to ` in case of tie at n−1, the resulting score distribution can then be easily derived
from Theorem 2.1 by appropriate conditioning; for instance, the score (n+`−1, n+
k−1), k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , `−1} occurs in an A-game with probability pn−1,n−1,AA p`,k,AA +
pn−1,n−1,BA p
`,k,A
B . We stress that all results we derive in the later sections can also be
extended to scoring systems involving tie-breaks, again by appropriate conditioning.
Finally, various papers discuss tie-break strategies (whether to play through or
to set the game to `) on the basis of pa and pb; see, e.g., Renick (1976, 1977),
Simmons (1989), or Percy (2009).
3 Distribution of the number of rallies under the
side-out scoring system.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the literature contains few results about the
number of rallies D to complete a single game played under the side-out scoring
system. Of course, the distribution of D can always be investigated by simula-
tions; see, e.g., Percy (2009), where Monte Carlo methods are used to estimate the
expectation of D for a broad range of rally-winning probabilities in the no-server
model. To the best of our knowledge, the only available theoretical result is due
to Simmons (1989), and provides lower and upper bounds on the expectation of D
in an A-game conditional on a victory of A on the score (n, k). More specifically,
letting
eα,β,C2C1 := E[D |Eα,β,C2 , S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}, (1)
Simmons’ result states that
(n+ k) 1+q1−q ≤ en,k,AA ≤ (n+ k) 1+q1−q + 2k, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. (2)
Unless a shutout is considered (that is, k = 0), this is only an approximate result,
whose accuracy quickly decreases with k. Again, the reason why no exact results
are available is that all analyses of the game in the literature are of a point-level
nature. In sharp contrast, our rally-level analysis allows, inter alia, for obtaining
exact values of all moments of D, as well as its complete distribution.
3.1 Moments.
We first introduce the following notation. Let Rα,β,AA (resp., R
α,β,B
A ) be a random
variable assuming values r = γ0, γ0 + 1, . . . , γ1 (resp., r = 1, 2, . . . , γ2 + 1) with
corresponding probabilities Wα,β,AA (q, r) :=
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
qr/ [
∑γ1
s=γ0
(
α
s
)(
β−1
s−1
)
qs] (resp.,
Wα,β,BA (q, r) :=
(
α
r−1
)(
β−1
r−1
)
qr−1/ [
∑γ2+1
s=1
(
α
s−1
)(
β−1
s−1
)
qs−1]). Conditioning with re-
spect to the number of A-interruptions and exchanges then yields the following
result (see the Appendix for the proof).
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Theorem 3.1 Let t 7→Mα,β,C2C1 (t) = E[etD |Eα,β,C2 , S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}, be
the moment generating function of D conditional on the event Eα,β,C2 ∩ [S = C1],
and let δC1,C2 = 1 if C1 = C2 and 0 otherwise. Then
Mα,β,CA (t) =
( (1− q)et
1− qe2t
)α+β
E[et(2R
α,β,C
A −δB,C)],
for C ∈ {A,B}.
Quite remarkably, those moment generating functions (hence also all resulting
moments) depend on (pa, pb) through q = (1 − pa)(1 − pb) only. Taking first and
second derivatives with respect to t in the above expressions and setting t = 0 then
directly yields the following closed form expressions for the expected values eα,β,C2C1
from (1) and for the corresponding variances
vα,β,C2C1 := Var[D |Eα,β,C2 , S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}.
Corollary 3.1 For C ∈ {A,B}, we have (i) eα,β,CA = (α + β) 1+q1−q − δB,C +
2 E[Rα,β,CA ] and (ii) v
α,β,C
A = 4(α+β)
q
(1−q)2 +4 Var[R
α,β,C
A ]. Moreover, (iii) e
α,β,C
A
is strictly monotone increasing in q.
Clearly, Corollary 3.1 confirms Simmons’ result that the expected number of
rallies in an A-game won by A on the score (n, k) is en,k,AA = n
1+q
1−q for k = 0. More
interestingly, it also shows that the exact value for any k > 0 is given by
en,k,AA = (n+ k)
1+q
1−q + 2
∑k
r=1 rW
n,k,A
A (q, r), k = 1, . . . , n− 1. (3)
Note that this is compatible with Simmons’ result in (2) since the second term in the
right-hand side of (3) is a weighted mean of 2r, r = 1, . . . , k. Similarly, the expected
number of rallies in an A-game won by B on the score (k, n), k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, is
ek,n,BA = (n+ k)
1+q
1−q − 1 + 2
∑k+1
r=1 rW
k,n,B
A (q, r).
The expectation and variance of D, in a C-game won by A, are then given by{ eAC := E[D|EA, S = C] = 1pAC ∑n−1k=0 pn,k,AC en,k,AC
vAC := Var[D|EA, S = C] =
[
1
pAC
∑n−1
k=0 p
n,k,A
C (v
n,k,A
C + (e
n,k,A
C )
2)
]
− (eAC)2,
(4)
while, in a C-game unconditional on the winner, they are given by{
eC := E[D|S = C] = pACeAC + pBCeBC ,
vC := Var[D|S = C] = (vAC + (eAC)2)pAC + (vBC + (eBC)2)pBC − (eC)2.
(5)
Finally, unconditional on the server, this yields
eA := E[D|EA] = eAAsa + eABsb, e := E[D] = eAsa + eBsb,
vA := Var[D|EA] = (vAA + (eAA)2)sa + (vAB + (eAB)2)sb − (eA)2,
v := Var[D] = (vA + e
2
A)sa + (vB + e
2
B)sb − e2.
(6)
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Figures 1(c)-(f) plot, for n = 15, en,k,AA , e
k,n,B
A , (v
n,k,A
A )
1/2, and (vk,n,BA )
1/2 ver-
sus k for (pa, pb) = (.7, .5), (.6, .5), (.5, .5), and (.4, .5), and report the correspond-
ing numerical values of eAA, e
B
A , eA, (v
A
A)
1/2, (vBA )
1/2, and v
1/2
A . All expectation and
standard deviation curves appear to be strictly monotone increasing functions of
the number (n+k) of points scored, which was maybe expected. More surprising is
the fact that—if one discards very small values of k—these curves are also roughly
linear. Clearly, Simmons’ lower and upper bounds (2), which are plotted versus
k in Figure 1(c), only provide poor approximations of the exact expected values,
particularly so for large k.
The dependence on (pa, pb) may be more interesting than that on k. Note that,
for each k, en,k,AA and e
k,n,B
A (hence also, e
A
A, e
B
A , and eA) are decreasing functions
of pa, which confirms Corollary 3.1(iii). Similarly, all quantities related to standard
deviations also seem to be decreasing functions of pa. Now, it is seen that, as a
function of pa, the expectation e
A
A is more spread out than e
B
A . Indeed, the former
ranges from 32.95 (pa = .7) to 56.30 (pa = .4), whereas the latter ranges from 41.95
to 51.43. On the contrary, the standard deviation of D is more concentrated in an
A-game won by A (where it ranges from 8.34 (pa = .7) to 10.90 (pa = .4)) than
in an A-game won by B (where it ranges from 7.36 to 11.44). This phenomenon
will appear even more clearly in Figure 3 below, where the same values of (pa, pb)
are considered. Note that the values of eAA, e
B
A , and eA are totally in line with the
score distribution and the expected values of D for each scores. For instance, the
value eBA = 41.95 for pa = .7 translates the fact that when B wins such an A-game,
it is very likely (see Figure 1(b)) that he/she will do so on a score that is quite
tight, resulting on a large expected value for D (whereas, a priori, the values of
ek,n,BA range from 47.82 to 21.29 when k goes from 14 to 0). The dependence of the
expectation and standard deviation of D on rally-winning probabilities will further
be investigated in Section 4 for the no-server model when comparing the side-out
scoring system with its rally-point counterpart.
Finally, in the case pa = pb = .5, the fact that A is the first server in the game
again brings some asymmetry in the expected values and standard deviations of D;
in particular, this serve advantage alone is responsible for the fact that 48.31 = eAA <
eBA = 49.17, and, maybe more mysteriously, that 10.23 = (v
A
A)
1/2 > (vBA )
1/2 = 9.95.
3.2 Distribution.
The moment generating functions given in Theorem 3.1 allow, through a suitable
change of variables, for obtaining the corresponding probability generating func-
tions. These can in turn be rewritten as power series whose coefficients yield the
distribution of D conditional on the event Eα,β,C ∩ [S = A] (see the Appendix for
the proof).
Theorem 3.2 Let z 7→ Gα,β,C2C1 (z) = E[zD |Eα,β,C2 , S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}, be
the probability generating function of D conditional on the event Eα,β,C2∩[S = C1].
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Then, for C ∈ {A,B},
Gα,β,CA (z) =
pαap
β
b q
δB,C
a
pα,β,CA
∑∞
j=0 q
jHα,β,CA (j) z
α+β+2j+δB,C ,
where, writing m+ := max(m, 0), we let
Hα,β,AA (j) :=
∑j
l=(j−γ1)+
(
α+β+l−1
l
)(
α
j−l
)(
β−1
j−l−1
)
and
Hα,β,BA (j) :=
∑j
l=(j−γ2)+
(
α+β+l−1
l
)(
α
j−l
)(
β−1
j−l
)
.
This result gives the probability distribution of D, conditional on Eα,β,C∩ [S =
A], for C ∈ {A,B}. Note that, as expected, we have P[D = d |Eα,β,A, S = A] =
0 = P[D = d + 1 |Eα,β,B , S = A] for all d < α + β. Moreover, for all nonnegative
integer j, P[D = α+β+2j+1 | Eα,β,A, S = A] = 0 = P[D = α+β+2j | Eα,β,B , S =
A]. In the sequel, we refer to this as the server-effect.
Theorem 3.2 of course allows for investigating the shape of the distribution of D
above all scores, and not only, as in Figures 1(c)-(f), its expectation and standard
deviation. This is what is done in Figure 2, which plots, as a function of the score,
quantiles of order α = .01, .05, .25, .5, .75, .95, and .99 for (pa, pb) = (.6, .5). For
each α, two types of quantiles are reported, namely (i) the standard quantile qα :=
inf{d : P[D ≤ d |Eα,β,C , S = A] ≥ α} and (ii) an interpolated quantile, for which
the interpolation is conducted linearly over the set (d, d+2) containing the expected
quantile (here, we avoid interpolating over (d, d + 1) because of the above server-
effect, which implies that either d or d + 1 does not bear any probability mass).
One of the most prominent features of Figure 2 is the wiggliness of the standard
quantile curves, which is directly associated with the server-effect. It should be
noted that the expectation curves (which are the same as in Figures 1(c)-(d)) stand
slightly above the median curves, which possibly indicates that, above each score,
the conditional distribution of D is somewhat asymmetric to the right. This (light)
asymmetry is confirmed by the other quantiles curves.
Now, the probability distribution ofD in an A-game, unconditional on the score,
is of course derived trivially from its conditional version obtained above and the
score distribution of Section 2. The general form of this distribution is somewhat
obscure (and will not be explicitly given here), but it yields easily interpretable
expressions for small values of d. For instance, one obtains
P[D = n|S = A] = pna ,
P[D = n+ 1|S = A] = qapnb ,
P[D = n+ 2|S = A] = nqpna + paqapnb , . . .
Finally, the unconditional distribution of D is simply obtained through P[D = k] =
P[D = k|S = A]sa+P[D = k|S = B]sb, k ≥ 0, where one computes the distribution
for a B-game by inverting pa and pb in the distribution for an A-game.
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Figure 3 shows that there are a number of remarkable aspects to these distri-
butions. First note the influence of the above mentioned server-effect, which causes
the wiggliness visible in most curves there. Also note that the distributions in
Figure 3(c) are much less wiggling than the corresponding curves in Figures 3(a)-
(b). As it turns out, this wiggliness is present, albeit more or less markedly, at all
stages (that is, not only to the right of the mode) for every choice of (pa, pb). Most
importantly, despite their irregular aspect, all curves are essentially unimodal, as
expected. Now, consider the dependence on pa of the position and spread of these
curves. One sees that while their spread clearly increases much more rapidly with pa
in Figure 3(b) than in Figure 3(a), the opposite can be said for their mode. This
is easily understood in view of the corresponding means and variances, which are
recalled in the legend boxes (and coincide with those from Figure 1). As for the
curves in Figure 3(c), they are obtained by averaging the corresponding curves in
Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) with weights pAA and p
B
A = 1−pAA, respectively. Taking
into account the values of these probabilities explains why the curves with pa = .7
and pa = .6 are essentially the corresponding curves in Figure 3(a), whereas that
with pa = .4 is closer to the corresponding curve in Figure 3(b).
4 Comparison with the rally-point scoring system.
One of the main motivations for this work was to compare more deeply the side-out
scoring system considered in Sections 2 and 3 with the rally-point scoring system.
As mentioned in the Introduction, many sports recently switched (e.g., badminton,
volley-ball)—or are in the process of switching (e.g., squash)—from the side-out
scoring system to its rally-point counterpart, whereas others (e.g., racquetball) so
far are sticking to the side-out scoring system. It is therefore natural to investigate
the implications of the transition to the rally-point system.
The literature, however, has focused on the impact of the scoring system on the
outcome of the game—studied by comparing the game-winning probabilities under
both scoring systems; see, e.g., Simmons (1989). This is all the more surprising
since there have been, in the sport community, much debate and questions about
how much the duration of the game is affected by the scoring system. Moreover, it
is usually reported that the main motivation for turning to the rally-point system
is to regulate the playing time (that is, to make the length of the match more
predictable), which is of primary importance for television, for instance. Whether
the transition to the rally-point system has indeed served that goal, and, if it has, to
what extent, are questions that have not been considered in the literature, and were
at best addressed on empirical grounds only (by international sport federations).
In this section, we will provide an in-depth comparison of the two scoring sys-
tems, both in terms of game-winning probabilities and in terms of durations, which
will provide theoretical answers to the questions above. Again, this is made possi-
ble by our rally-level analysis of the game and the results of the previous sections
on the distribution of the number of rallies under the side-out scoring system. As
we will discuss in Section 6, our results are potentially of high interest both for
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international federations and for local tournament organizers.
4.1 Game-winning probabilities.
Although the game-winning probabilities for an A-game played under the rally-
point system have already been obtained in the literature (see, e.g., Simmons 1989),
we start by deriving them quickly, mainly for the sake of completeness, but also
because they easily follow from the combinatorial methods used in the previous
sections. First note that there cannot be exchanges (in the sense of Definition 2.1)
in the rally-point scoring system. We then denote by E¯α,β,CA (r) (C ∈ {A,B}) the
event associated with a sequence of rallies that, in the rally-point system, (i) gives
raise to α points scored by Player A and β points scored by Player B, (ii) involves
exactly r A-interruptions, and (iii) is such that Player C scores a point in the last
rally; again, it is assumed here that α > 0 (resp., β > 0) if C = A (resp., if C = B).
We write
p¯α,β,C2C1 (r) := P[E¯
α,β,C2(r)|S = C1], C1, C2 ∈ {A,B}.
The following result then follows along the same lines as for Lemma 2.1 and Theo-
rem 2.1.
Theorem 4.1 (i) With the notation above, p¯α,β,AA (r) =
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
pα−ra p
β−r
b (qaqb)
r,
r ∈ {γ0, . . . , γ1}, and p¯α,β,BA (r) =
(
α
r−1
)(
β−1
r−1
)
pα−r+1a p
β−r
b qa(qaqb)
r−1, r ∈ {1, . . . , γ2+
1}. (ii) Writing p¯α,β,CA for the probability of the event E¯α,β,CA := ∪r E¯α,β,CA (r), we
have p¯α,β,AA = p
α
ap
β
b
∑γ1
r=γ0
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
(tatb)
r and p¯α,β,BA = p
α
ap
β−1
b qa
∑γ2+1
r=1
(
α
r−1
)(
β−1
r−1
)
(tatb)
r−1, where we let ta = qa/pa and tb = qb/pb.
Remark 4.1 These expressions further simplify in the no-server model (p :=)pa =
1 − pb. There we indeed have tb = t−1a , so that the above formulas yield p¯α,β,AA =(
α+β−1
β
)
pα(1− p)β and p¯α,β,BA =
(
α+β−1
α
)
pα(1− p)β .
Of course, the resulting score distribution and game-winning probabilities for
an A-game directly follow from Theorem 4.1. In accordance with the notation
adopted for the side-out scoring system, we will write
p¯AC := P[E¯
A|S = C] := P[∪n−1k=0En,k,A|S = C] :=
n−1∑
k=0
p¯n,k,AC , p¯
B
C := 1− p¯AC ,
p¯n,k,A := P[E¯n,k,A] = p¯n,k,AA sa+ p¯
n,k,A
B sb, p¯
k,n,B := P[E¯k,n,B ] = p¯k,n,BA sa+ p¯
k,n,B
B sb,
and
p¯C := P[E¯C ] = p¯CAsa + p¯
C
Bsb.
Figures 4(a)-(b) plot the same score distribution curves as in Figures 1(a)-(b),
respectively, but in the case of an A-game played under the rally-point scoring
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system with n = 21. Both pairs of plots look roughly similar, although extreme
scores seem to be less likely in the rally-point scoring; this confirms the findings
from Simmons (1989) according to which shutouts are less frequent under the rally-
point scoring system. Note also that, unlike for the side-out scoring, the (pa, pb) =
(.5, .5) curve in Figure 4(a) is the exact reverse image of the corresponding one
in Figure 4(b): for the rally-point scoring, Player A does not get any advantage
from serving first if (pa, pb) = (.5, .5), which is confirmed by the game-winning
probabilities p¯AA = p¯
B
A = .5.
Again, the dependence of the game-winning probabilities on (pa, pb) is of pri-
mary importance. We will investigate this dependence visually and compare it
with the corresponding dependence for the side-out scoring system. To do so, we
focus on the no-server version (p = pa = 1 − pb) of Badminton, where, as already
mentioned, the side-out scoring system with n = 15 (men’s singles) was recently
replaced with the rally-point one characterized by n = 21. The results are reported
in Figures 5(a)-(b). Figure 5(a) supports the claim—reported, e.g., in Simmons
(1989) or Percy (2009)—stating that, for any fixed p, the scoring barely influences
game-winning probabilities. Now, while Figure 5(b) shows that the probability that
Player A wins an A-game is essentially the same for both scoring systems if he/she
is the best player (p¯AA/p
A
A ∈ (.926, 1) for p ≥ .5, and p¯AA/pAA ∈ (.997, 1) for p > .7), it
tells another story for p < .5: there, the probability that A wins an A-game played
under the rally-point system (i) becomes relatively negligible for very small values
of p (in the sense that p¯AA/p
A
A → 0 as p → 0) and (ii) can be up to 28 times larger
than under the side-out system (for values of p close to .1). Of course, one can
say that (i) is irrelevant since it is associated with an event (namely, a victory of
A) occurring with very small probability; (ii), however, constitutes an important
difference between both scoring systems for values of p that are not so extreme.
4.2 Durations.
In the rally-point system, the number of rallies needed to achieve the event E¯α,β,C2∩
[S = C1] is not random: with obvious notation, it is almost surely equal to e¯
α,β,C2
C1
=
α+β, which explains why Figure 4 does not contain the rally-point counterparts of
Figure 1(c)-(f). The various conditional and unconditional means and variances of
the number of rallies in the rally-point system (that is, the quantities e¯AC , v¯
A
C , e¯C ,
v¯C , e¯
A, v¯A, e¯, v¯) can then be readily computed from the game-winning probabilities
given in Theorem 4.1, in the exact same way as in (4)-(6) for the side-out scoring
system. More generally, the corresponding distribution of the number of rallies in
a game trivially follows from the same game-winning probabilities.
Figures 5(c)-(h) plot, as functions of p = pa = 1 − pb (hence, in the no-server
model), expected values and standard deviations of the numbers of rallies needed
to complete (i) A-games played under the side-out system with n = 15 and (ii) A-
games played under the rally-point system with n = 21. Clearly, those plots allow
for an in-depth original comparison of both scoring systems. Let us first focus on
durations unconditional on the winner of the game. Figure 5(c) shows that (i)
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games played under the side-out system will last longer than those played under
the rally-point one for players of roughly the same level (which was expected since
the side-out system will then lead to many exchanges), whereas (ii) the opposite is
true when one player is much stronger (which is explained by the fact that shutouts
require more rallies in the rally-point scoring considered than in the side-out one).
Maybe less expected is the fact (Figure 5(f)) that the standard deviation of D is,
uniformly in p ∈ (0, 1), smaller for the rally-point scoring system than for the side-
out system, which shows that the transition to the rally-point system indeed makes
the length of the match more predictable. The twin-peak shape of both standard
deviation curves is even more surprising. Finally, note that, while the rally-point
curves in Figures 5(c) and (f) are symmetric about p = .5, the side-out curves are
not, which is due to the server-effect. This materializes into the limits of eA given
by 16 and 15 as p → 0 and p → 1, respectively (which was expected: if Player B
wins each rally with probability one, he/she will indeed need 16 rallies to win an
A-game, since he/she has to regain the right to serve before scoring his/her first
point), but also translates into (i) the fact that the mode of the side-out curve in
Figure 5(c) is not exactly located in p = .5 and (ii) the slightly different heights of
the two local (side-out) maxima in Figure 5(f).
We then turn to durations conditional on the winner of the game, whose ex-
pected values and standard deviations are reported in Figures 5(d), (e), (g), and
(h). These figures look most interesting and reveal important differences between
both scoring systems. Even the general shape of the curves there are of a different
nature for both scorings; for instance, the rally-point curves in Figures 5(d)-(e) are
monotonic, while the side-out ones are unimodal. Similarly, in Figure 5(g), the
rally-point curve is unimodal, whereas the side-out curve exhibits a most unex-
pected bimodal shape. It is also interesting to look at limits as p→ 0 or p→ 1 in
those four subfigures; these limits, which are derived in Appendix A.3, are plotted
as short horizontal lines. Consider first limits above events occurring with probabil-
ity one, that is, limits as p→ 1 in Figures 5(d), (g) and limits p→ 0 in Figures 5(e),
(h). The resulting limits are totally in line with the intuition: the four conditional
standard deviations go to zero, which implies that the limiting conditional distribu-
tion of D simply is almost surely equal to the corresponding limiting (conditional)
expectations. The latter themselves assume very natural values: for instance, for
the same reason as above, eBA converges to 16, which is therefore the limit of D in
probability.
Much more surprising is what happens for limits above events occurring with
probability zero, that is, limits as p → 0 in Figures 5(d), (g) and limits as p → 1
in Figures 5(e), (h). Focussing first on the side-out scoring system, it is seen
that a (miraculous) victory of A will require, in the limit, almost surely D = 15
points, while the limiting conditional distribution of D for victories of B is non-
degenerate. The latter distribution is shown (see Appendix A.3) to be uniform
over {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n} (hence is stochastically bounded!), which is compatible
with the values n+1+(n−1)/2(≈ 3n/2) and (n−1)2/12 for the limiting expectation
and variance, respectively. It should be noted here that this huge difference between
those two limiting conditional distributions of D is entirely due to the server-effect.
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In the absence of the server-effect, the subfigures (e) and (h) should indeed be
the exact reverse image of the subfigures (d) and (g), respectively. Similarly, the
bimodality of the side-out curve in Figure 5(g) is also due to the server-effect. We
then consider the rally-point scoring, which is not affected by the server-effect,
so that it is sufficient to consider at the limits as p → 0 in Figures 5(d), (g).
There, one also gets a non-degenerate limiting conditional distribution for D, with
expectation 2n2/(n+ 1)(≈ 2n) and variance 2n2(n− 1)/[(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)](≈ 2).
5 Simulations.
We performed several Monte Carlo simulations, one for each figure considered so
far (except Figure 2, as it already contains many theoretical curves). To describe
the general procedure, we focus on the Monte Carlo experiment associated with
the side-out scoring system in Figure 5 (results for the rally-point scoring system
there or for the other figures are obtained similarly). For each of the 1, 999 values
of p considered in Figure 5, the corresponding values of pAA(p), eA(p), vA(p), e
C
A(p),
vCA(p), C ∈ {A,B}, were estimated on the basis of J = 200 independent replications
of an A-game played under the side-out scoring system with pa = 1 − pb = p. Of
course, for each fixed p, the game-winning probability pCA(p) is simply estimated by
the proportion of games won by C in the J corresponding A-games:
pˆCA(p) :=
JC
J
:=
1
J
J∑
j=1
ICj ,
where ICj , j = 1, . . . , J , is equal to one (resp., zero) if Player C won (resp., lost) the
jth game. The corresponding estimates for eA(p), vA(p), e
C
A(p), and v
C
A(p) then
are given by
eˆA(p) :=
1
J
J∑
j=1
dj vˆA(p) :=
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
dj − eˆA(p)
)2
,
eˆCA(p) :=
1
JC
J∑
j=1
djI
C
j , and vˆ
C
A(p) :=
1
JC
J∑
j=1
(
dj − eˆCA(p)
)2
ICj , (7)
where dj , j = 1, . . . , J , is the total number of rallies in the jth game. These
estimates are plotted in thin blue lines in Figure 5. Clearly, these simulations
validate our theoretical results in Figures 5(a), (c), and (f). To describe what
happens in the other plots, consider, e.g., Figure 5(g). There, it appears that
the theoretical results are confirmed for large values of p only. However, this is
simply explained by the fact that for small values of p, the denominator of vˆAA(p)
(see (7)) is very small. Actually, among the 542 × 200 A-games associated with
the 542 values of p ≤ .2710, not a single one here led to a victory of A, so that
the corresponding estimates vˆAA(p) are not even defined. Of course, values of p
slightly larger than .2710 still give raise to a small number of victories of A, so that
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the corresponding estimates vˆAA(p) are highly unreliable. The situation of course
improves substantially as p increases, as it can be seen in Figure 5(g). Figures 5(b),
(d), (e), and (h) can be interpreted exactly in the same way.
This underlines the fact that expectations and variances conditional on events
with small probabilities are of course extremely difficult—if not impossible—to
estimate. To quantify this, let us focus again on Figure 5(g), and consider the
local maximum on the left of the plot, which is (on the grid of values of p at
hand) located in p0 := .0085. The probability p
A
A(p0) of a victory of A in an A-
game played under the side-out scoring system with p = p0 is about 3.5 × 10−31.
Estimating vAA(p0) with the same accuracy as that achieved for, e.g., v
A
A(.5) in
Figure 5(g) would then require a number of replications of (fixed p0) A-games
that is about 200 × pAA(.5)/pAA(p0) ≈ 3 × 1032. Assuming that 106 replications
can be performed in a second by a super computer (which is overly optimistic),
this estimation of vAA(p0) would still require not less than 9.5 × 1018 years! This
means that it is indeed impossible to estimate in a reliable way the conditional
variance curve for p close to p0, hence that there is no way to empirically capture
the convergence of vAA(p) to 0 as p → 0. Without our theoretical analysis, there
is therefore no hope to learn about the degeneracy (resp., non-degeneracy) of the
limiting distribution of D conditional on a victory of A as p→ 0 (resp., conditional
on a victory of B as p→ 1).
We will not comment in detail the Monte Carlo results associated with the other
figures. We just report that they again confirm our theoretical findings, whenever
possible, that is, whenever they are not associated with conditional results above
events with small probabilities.
6 Conclusion and final comments.
This paper provides a complete rally-level probabilistic description for games played
under the side-out scoring system. It complements the previous main contributions
by Phillips (1978), Strauss and Arnold (1987), and Simmons (1989) by adding to
the well-known game-winning probabilities an exhaustive knowledge of the random
duration of the game. This brings a much better understanding of the underlying
process as a whole, as is demonstrated in Sections 2 to 4.
In this final section, we will mainly focus on the practical implications of our
findings. For this, we may restrict to (pa, pb) ∈ [.4, .6]×[.4, .6], say, since players tend
to be grouped according to strength. For such values of the rally-winning probabili-
ties, our results show that the recent transition—in mens’ singles’ Badminton—from
the n = 15 side-out scoring system to the n = 21 rally-point one strongly affected
the properties of the game. They indeed indicate that (i) games played under the
rally-point scoring system are much shorter than those played according to the side-
out one, and that (ii) the uncertainty in the duration of the match is significantly
reduced. Our results allow to quantify both effects. On the other hand, they show
that game-winning probabilities are essentially the same for both scoring systems.
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It is then tempting to conclude (as in Simmons (1989) and Percy (2009)) that
the outcomes of the matches are barely influenced by the scoring system adopted.
While this is strictly valid in the model, it is highly disputable under possible vio-
lations of the model (stating, e.g., that players might get tired at different speeds)
which, given the reduced duration of the game emphasized by our analysis, may
appear quite relevant.
In practice, the results of this paper can be useful to many actors of the sport
community. For the international sport federations playing with the idea of replac-
ing the side-out scoring system with the rally-point one, our results could be used to
tune n (i.e., the number of points to be scored to win a rally-point game) according
to their wishes. For the sake of illustration, consider again the transition performed
by the International Badminton Federation (IBF). Presumably, their objective was
(i) to make the duration of the game more predictable and (ii) to ensure that the
outcome of the matches would change as little as possible. If this was indeed their
objective, then our results show that it has been partially achieved. However, it is
now easy to see that other choices of n would have been even better in that respect,
the choice of n = 27 (see Figure 6(d) and (b)), being optimal. Moreover, this last
choice would have affected the duration of the game much less than n = 21 (see
Figure 6(c)), and thus would have made the outcome of the matches more robust
to possible violations of the model.
For organizers of local tournaments played under the side-out scoring system,
our results can be used to control, for any fixed number of planned matches, the
time required to complete their events. Such a control over this random time, at any
fixed tolerance level, can indeed be achieved in a quite direct way from our results
on the duration of a game played under the side-out scoring system. Organizers can
then deduce, at the corresponding tolerance level, the number of matches—hence
the number of players—their events will be able to host. This of course concerns the
sports that are still using this scoring system, such as racquetball and squash (for
the latter, only in countries currently using the so-called English scoring system).
Finally, our results also open the way to more efficient estimation of the rally-
winning probabilities (pa, pb) in the side-out scoring system. Consequently, they po-
tentially lead to more accurate ranking procedures (based on Bradley-Terry paired
comparison methods), which is of course of high interest to national and interna-
tional federations still supporting that scoring system. A full discussion of this
is beyond the scope of this paper (and is actually the topic of Paindaveine and
Swan 2009), and we only briefly describe the main idea here. Essentially, the re-
sults of the present work, in a point estimation framework, enable us to perform
maximum likelihood estimation of (pa, pb) based on game scores and durations. It is
natural to wonder how much the resulting estimators would improve on the purely
score-based maximum likelihood estimators proposed by Strauss and Arnold (1987).
It turns out that the improvement is very important. First of all, unlike the purely
score-based estimators, which require numerical optimization techniques, the score-
and-duration-based ones happen to allow for elegant closed form expressions. Sec-
ond, they can be shown to enjoy strong finite-sample optimality properties. Last
but not least, they are much more accurate than their Strauss and Arnold (1987)
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competitors, especially so for small numbers of observations (i.e., games). This
is illustrated in Figure 7, where it can be seen that even for as little as m = 2
games, the score-and-duration-based maximum likelihood estimators outperform
their competitors both in terms of bias and variability. Clearly, this will have price-
less practical consequences for the resulting ranking procedures, since any fixed pair
of players typically do not meet more than once or twice in the period (usually one
year) on which this ranking is to be computed.
A Appendix.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.1.
In the Appendix, we simply write interruptions for A-interruptions.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Clearly, pα,β,AA (r, j) = Kr,j p
α
ap
β
b (qaqb)
r+j , where Kr,j is
the number of ways of setting r interruptions and j exchanges in the sequence of
rallies achieving the event under consideration. Regarding interruptions, we argue
as in Hsi and Burich (1971), and say those r interruptions should be put into the
α possible spots (remember the last point should be won by A), while the β points
scored by B should be distributed among those r interruptions—with at least one
point scored by B in each interruption (so that there may be at most r = min(α, β)
interruptions). There are exactly
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
ways to achieve this. As for the j
exchanges, they may occur at any time and thus there are as many ways of placing
j interruptions as there are distributions of j indistinguishable balls into α+β urns,
i.e.
(
α+β−1
j
)
. Summing up, we have proved that
pα,β,AA (r, j) =
(
α+ β − 1
j
)(
α
r
)(
β − 1
r − 1
)
pαap
β
b (qaqb)
r+j ,
with r = min(β, 1), . . . ,min(α, β), j ∈ N.
As for pα,β,BA (r, j), this probability is clearly of the form Lr,j p
α
ap
β
b qa(qaqb)
r+j−1.
In this case, there are α + 1 possible spots for the r interruptions. But since B
scores the last point, the sequence of rallies should end with an interruption. There
are therefore
(
α
r−1
)
ways to insert the interruptions. Each interruption contains
at least one point for B, so that r ≤ min(α + 1, β). The result follows by noting
that there are
(
β−1
r−1
)
ways of distributing the β points scored by B into those r
interruptions, and by dealing with exchanges as for pα,β,AA (r, j). 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The result directly follows from Lemma 2.1 by writ-
ing pα,β,AA =
∑
r,j p
α,β,A
A (r, j) and p
α,β,B
A =
∑
r,j p
α,β,B
A (r, j) (where the sums
are over all possible values of r and j in each case), and by using the equality∑∞
j=0
(
m+j−1
j
)
zj = (1− z)−m for any z ∈ [0, 1). 
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A.2 Proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 and of Corollary 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. First note that if A scores the last point in an A-game
in which the score is α to β after j exchanges (j ∈ {0, 1, . . .}) and r interruptions
(r ∈ {γ0, . . . , γ1}), then there have been α+ β + 2(r + j) rallies . Conditioning on
the number of interruptions and exchanges therefore yields
Mα,β,AA (t) = (p
α,β,A
A )
−1∑
j
∑
r
et(α+β+2(r+j))pα,β,AA (r, j)
(where the sums are over all possible values of r and j in each case) and thus, from
Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.1,
Mα,β,AA (t) =
et(α+β)
∑
j
(
e2tq
)j (α+β+j−1
j
)∑
r e
2tr
(
α
r
)(
β−1
r−1
)
qr
(1− q)−(α+β)∑r (αr)(β−1r−1)qr
= ((1− q)et)α+β
(∑
j
(
e2tq
)j (α+β+j−1
j
))(∑
r e
2trWα,β,AA (q, r)
)
.
The first claim of Theorem 3.1 follows.
For the second claim, it suffices to note that if B scores the last point in an
A-game in which the score is of α to β after j exchanges (j ∈ {0, 1, . . .}) and r
interruptions (r ∈ {1, . . . , γ2 + 1}), then the number of rallies equals α+ β + 2(r−
1 + j) + 1; the computations above then hold with only minor changes. 
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Taking first and second derivatives of the moment
generating functions yields the expectations and variances given in Corollary 3.1.
Moreover it can easily be seen that derivatives of the expected values with respect
to q are positive by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and thus the latter are
strictly monotone increasing in q. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The change of variables z = et in the moment gen-
erating functions given in Theorem 3.1 immediately yields the probability gener-
ating functions. If β = 0, the latter is already in the form of an infinite series
Gα,0,AA (z) =
∑∞
j=0(1− q)αqj
(
α+j−1
j
)
zα+2j . If β > 0, we have
Gα,β,AA (z) = (1− q)α+βzα+β
∞∑
j=0
Kjz
2j
γ1∑
r=1
Wrz
2r,
where Kj = q
j
(
α+β+j−1
j
)
and Wr = W
α,β,A
A (q, r). This double sum satisfies
∞∑
j=0
Kj
γ1∑
r=1
Wrz
2(j+r) =
γ1∑
j=1
z2j
(
j−1∑
l=0
KlWj−l
)
+
∞∑
j=γ1+1
z2j
 j−1∑
l=j−γ1
KlWj−l
 .
The same arguments are readily adapted to Gα,β,BA (z), and Theorem 3.2 follows.

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A.3 The distribution of the number of rallies , in the no-
server model, for extreme values of the rally-winning
probabilities.
As announced in Section 4.2, we determine here the limiting behavior of the number
of rallies D, in the no-server model, for p→ 0 and p→ 1, conditional on the winner
of the A-game considered. We start with the limit under almost sure events, that
is, limits as p→ 1 (resp., p→ 0) for the distribution of D conditional on a victory
of A (resp., of B).
Proposition A.1 Let, for the side-out scoring system, t 7→MCA (t) = E[etD |EC , S =
A], C ∈ {A,B}, be the moment generating function of D conditional on the
event EC ∩ [S = A]. Denote by t 7→ M¯CA (t) = E[etD | E¯C , S = A], C ∈ {A,B},
the corresponding moment generating function for the rally-point system. Then, (i)
as p → 1, MAA (t) → ent and M¯AA (t) → ent; (ii) as p → 0, MBA (t) → e(n+1)t and
M¯BA (t)→ ent.
Proof: (i) By conditioning, we get MAA (t) =
∑n−1
k=0 M
n,k,A
A (t)p
n,k,A
A /p
A
A. It is easy
to check that limp→1 p
n,k,A
A /p
A
A = δk,0 and that limp→1M
n,k,A
A (t) = e
(n+k)t. Hence
limp→1MAA (t) = e
nt. Likewise, M¯AA (t) =
∑n−1
k=0 e
(n+k)tp¯n,k,AA /p¯
A
A. Again, it is easy
to check that limp→1 p¯
n,k,A
A /p¯
A
A = δk,0. Hence, we indeed have M¯
A
A (t) → ent. (ii)
The proof is similar, and thus left to the reader. 
Corollary A.1 (i) As p → 1, (eAA, vAA) → (n, 0) and (e¯AA, v¯AA) → (n, 0), so that,
conditional on a victory of A in an A-game, D
P→ n, irrespective of the scoring
system; (ii) as p → 0, (eBA , vBA ) → (n + 1, 0) and (e¯BA , v¯BA ) → (n, 0), so that,
conditional on a victory of B in an A-game, D
P→ n+ 1 (resp., n) for the side-out
(resp., rally-point) scoring system.
As shown by Proposition A.1 and Corollary A.1, the situation is here very clear.
In each of the four cases considered, only one trajectory is possible, namely that
for which all rallies in the game will be won by the winner of the game.
Next we derive the limiting conditional distribution of D under events which
occur with zero probability, that is, limits as p → 1 (resp., p → 0) for the distri-
bution of D conditional on a victory of B (resp., of A). Our conclusions are much
more surprising.
Proposition A.2 Let m(t) :=
∑n−1
k=0 e
(n+k)t
(
n+k−1
k
)/∑n−1
k=0
(
n+k−1
k
)
. Then, (i)
as p → 0, MAA (t) → ent and M¯AA (t) → m(t); (ii) as p → 1, MBA (t) → (e(n+1)t −
e(2n+1)t)/(n(1 − et)) and M¯BA (t) → m(t). In particular, as p → 1, the limiting
distribution of D conditional on the event EB ∩ [S = A] is uniform over the set
{n+ 1, . . . , 2n}.
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Proof: We first prove the assertions for the rally-point scoring system. In this
case, M¯AA (t) =
∑n−1
k=0 e
(n+k)tp¯n,k,AA /p¯
A
A. Now, from Remark 4.1 it is immediate that
limp→0 p
n,k,A
A /p
A
A =
(
n+k−1
k
)/∑n−1
k=0
(
n+k−1
k
)
, which proves the claim for M¯AA (t)
(hence, by symmetry, also for M¯BA (t)).
Next consider the assertions for the side-out scoring system. First note that, as
before, MAA (t) =
∑n−1
k=0 M
n,k,A
A (t)p
n,k,A
A /p
A
A andM
B
A (t) =
∑n−1
k=0 M
k,n,B
A (t)p
k,n,B
A /p
B
A .
Now fix k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}. Using Theorem 2.1, one readily shows that
lim
p→0
pn,k,AA
/
pAA = δk,0 and lim
p→1
pk,n,BA
/
pBA = 1/n.
Combining these results and the definitions of the moment generating functions, it
is then straightforward to show that
lim
p→0
Mn,k,AA (t) = e
(n+k)t and lim
p→1
Mk,n,BA (t) = e
(n+k+1)t.
The claim follows. 
Corollary A.2 (i) As p→ 0, (eAA, vAA)→ (n, 0) and (e¯AA, v¯AA)→ ( 2n
2
n+1 ,
2n2(n−1)
(n+1)2(n+2) );
as p→ 1, (eBA , vBA )→ ( 3n+12 , (n−1)
2
12 ) and (e¯
B
A , v¯
B
A )→ ( 2n
2
n+1 ,
2n2(n−1)
(n+1)2(n+2) ).
It is remarkable that we can again give a complete description of the “distri-
bution of the process” (by this, we mean that we can again list all trajectories of
rallies leading to the event considered, and give, for each such trajectory, its proba-
bility). Consider first the side-out scoring system. For victories of A, the situation
is very clear: Corollary A.2 indeed yields that, conditional on a victory of A in an
A-game, D
P→ n as p→ 0, which implies that the only possible trajectory of rallies
is the one for which all rallies in the game are won by A. Turn then to victories
of B. There, we obtained in the proof of Proposition A.2 that all scores (k, n) are
equally likely. It is actually easy to show that, conditional on Ek,n,B ∩ [S = A],
D
P→ n + k + 1 as p → 1. This implies that there are exactly n equally likely
trajectories: A first scores k points, then loses his/her serve, before B scores n
(miraculous) points and wins the game (k = 0, . . . , n− 1).
Consider finally the rally-point system. In this case, it is sufficient to study the
distribution of the scores after victories of A (when p → 0) since the number of
rallies is a function of the scores only, and since the conclusions will, by symmetry,
be identical for victories of B (when p→ 1). Clearly, for any fixed k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−
1}, there are exactly (n+k−1k ) trajectories leading to the score (n, k), and those
trajectories are equally likely. Each such trajectory will then occur with probability
1/
∑n−1
k=0
(
n+k−1
k
)
, because, as we have seen in the proof of Proposition A.2, the
score (n, k) occurs with probability
(
n+k−1
k
)/∑n−1
k=0
(
n+k−1
k
)
. These considerations
provide the whole distribution of the process: there are
∑n−1
k=0
(
n+k−1
k
)
equally likely
possible trajectories, namely the ones we have just considered. The exact limiting
distribution of D can of course trivially be computed from this.
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Figure 1: All subfigures refer to an A-game played under the side-out scoring
system with n = 15. Left: for (pa, pb) = (.7, .5), (.6, .5), (.5, .5), and (.4, .5),
(a) probabilities pn,k,AA that Player A wins the game on the score (n, k)
(along with the probabilities pAA that Player A wins the game), (c) expected
values en,k,AA and (e) standard deviations (v
n,k,A
A )
1/2 of the numbers of ral-
lies D conditional on the corresponding events (along with the expected val-
ues eAA and standard deviations (v
A
A)
1/2 of D conditional on a victory of A).
Right: the corresponding values for victories of B on the score (k, n). As
for the expected values and standard deviations of D unconditional on the
score or the winner, we have (eA, v
1/2
A ) = (33.5, 8.6), (41.6, 9.5), (48.7, 10.1),
and (52.5, 11.5), for (pa, pb) = (.7, .5), (.6, .5), (.5, .5), and (.4, .5), respec-
tively. Estimated probabilities, expectations, and standard deviations based
on 5, 000 replications are also reported (thinner lines in plots and numbers
between parentheses in legend boxes). Dashed lines in (c) correspond to
Simmons’ (1989) lower and upper bounds in (2).
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Figure 2: Both subfigures refer to an A-game played under the side-out
scoring system with n = 15 and (pa, pb) = (.6, .5). Subfigure (a) (resp.,
Subfigure (b)) reports, in black and as a function of k, the α-quantile of the
number of rallies needed to complete the game, conditional on a victory of A
on the score (n, k) (resp., conditional on a victory of B on the score (k, n)),
with α = .01, .05, .25, .50, .75, .95, and .99. Solid lines (resp., dotted lines)
correspond to standard (resp., interpolated) quantiles; see Section 3.2 for
details. The green curves are the same as in Figure 1, hence give the expected
values of D conditional on the same events.
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Figure 3: All subfigures refer to an A-game played under the side-out scoring
system with n = 15. For (pa, pb) = (.7, .5), (.6, .5), (.5, .5), and (.4, .5), they
report the probabilities that the number of rallies D needed to complete
the game takes value d, (a) conditional upon a victory of Player A, (b)
conditional upon a victory of Player B, and (c) unconditional. Empirical
frequencies based on 20, 000 replications are also reported (thinner lines in
plots and numbers between parentheses in legend boxes).
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Figure 4: Both subfigures refer to an A-game played under the rally-point
scoring system with n = 21. Subfigure (a): for (pa, pb) = (.7, .5), (.6, .5),
(.5, .5), and (.4, .5), probabilities p¯n,k,AA that Player A wins the game on
the score (n, k), along with the probabilities p¯AA that Player A wins the
game. Subfigures (b): the corresponding values for victories of B on the
score (k, n). Estimated probabilities based on 5, 000 replications are also
reported (thinner lines in plots and numbers between parentheses in legend
boxes).
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Figure 5: As a function of p = pa = 1− pb (that is, in the no-server model),
probabilities p15,k,AA (in blue) that Player A wins an n = 15 side-out A-
game on the score (15, k), along with the probabilities p¯21,k,AA (in red) that
Player A wins an n = 21 rally-point A-game on the score (21, k). Expec-
tations (first row) and standard deviations (second row) of the number of
rallies needed to complete the corresponding games, unconditional on the
winner (first column), conditional on a victory of Player A (second column),
and conditional on a victory of Player B (third column). Estimated proba-
bilities, expectations, and standard deviations (based on 200 replications at
each value of p = 0, .0005, .0010, .0015, . . . , .9995) are also reported (thinner
lines).
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Figure 6: Subfigures (a)-(e) here report Subfigures (a)-(c), (f), and (e) from
Figure 5 with the only difference that the rally-point scoring here is based
on n = 27 (the side-out scoring is still based on n = 15).
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Figure 7: Subfigure (a) (resp., (b)) is a scatter plot of the values of
score-based (resp., score-and-duration-based) maximum likelihood estima-
tors for (pa, pb), from J = 1, 000 replications of m = 2 side-out A-games
with n = 15.
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